Brexit as tragedy, hubris and payback
There is a modest literature on military disasters. Over the three thousand years or so years of
recorded war – a period that has offered plenty of time for practice - leaders
during battles have consistently made appalling mistakes. The literature identifies a frequent common
cause.
It suggests that the overwhelming majority of these
catastrophes – episodes that typically involve appalling loss of life and
which, crucially, look almost inexplicably stupid after the fact – follow a
very particular pattern. In the heat of
battle, the on-field leader is killed and his number two is obliged to take
over at short notice.
The on-field leader has – typically – been selected and
schooled for the appointed role. He is
‘a leader’. He is strategic and
visionary. He is agile, flexible and
fast. As the unavoidable messiness of
battle unfolds, he ceaselessly adapts to circumstances. He makes decisions. He issues instructions. He commands the military machine at his
disposal.
Of course, he does not implement
these decisions. He is not especially
concerned with which particular platoon is deployed, which cavalry division is
sent to charge, which band of archers fires from the battlements. These things are the responsibility of his
number two, his senior lieutenant. The
senior lieutenant has mastery over the machine: he knows its component parts
and the chains of command that hold it together. He knows the rules and procedures that make
the machine function.
He is not a leader.
The reason he has risen to the esteemed rank of second-in-command – to
this position of extraordinary power – is because he is truly gifted at making
the machine work. He is not a
leader. At no point in his rise to power
has he had to depend on character traits such as strategic vision, or agile
thinking, or adaptability in the face of rapidly changing circumstances. He is careful, procedural, detailed,
mechanical. His entire personality is
geared towards the precise implementation of his leader’s decisions.
But, suddenly, he is in charge. His job now is to make decisions of a kind
that are not merely unfamiliar to him – they are psychologically impossible for
him. He is actually constitutionally
unable to do the job now assigned him.
Yet do the job he must!
He is in the heat of battle! It
is his duty! So he does what he knows. He sticks to the existing plan, and he
implements it. No matter how foolish,
risky or even mad. The plan was to march
in that direction. News arrives that it is a blind valley. It will be suicide. No matter.
It is the plan. Onward we must march.
**
It gets worse. Surely
there are others – siren voices, if you will – who can see that they are
marching towards suicide? Yes, of course
there are. Can you not hear their cries? But the machine – the
military machine – is finely tuned, the chains of command are the chains of
command, the smooth operation of the system has been endlessly refined and
improved.
And – guess what? The
person who knows the machine best of all, the person that has spent a lifetime
learning the machine, coming to understand its mechanisms, that person is now
in charge! The person in charge is now
quite literally the person best equipped to make the machine do whatever it
must – and best equipped, too, to ignore, nullify and overcome the murmurs,
shouts and screams of warning.
Catastrophe ensues. A
hideous confluence of the particular characteristics of a certain kind of
system; the inevitable characteristics of a particular kind of un-leader within
that system; and the sudden disappearance of the on-field leader. The history of battle is littered with
examples. It happens again and again and
again, for thousands of years.
Do I dare even describe the analogy with Brexit?
**
Yes I fucking do.
Theresa May is not merely the most useless individual to have the
job of Prime Minister in my lifetime; she is, constitutionally and
psychologically, not actually equipped to do the job. She is an un-leader, installed suddenly
following the unexpected disappearance of the actual leader. She is, I am sure, doing what she thinks is
right; but only in the way the on-field lieutenant thinks he is doing the right
thing by marching his troops towards certain death.
Around her, not just the Conservative Party but – and this,
for me at least, is the most awful part of this - the entire political edifice
of parliament is a quasi-militarised machine.
Both Government and Opposition (both, of course, "Her Majesty’s")
comprise a system of refined and ancient rules and procedures, of arcane job
titles, of mysterious rituals familiar only to in-group specialists, remarkably
analogous to Britain’s armed and security forces. May is a genuine expert in all this – how
else could she have served as Home Secretary for so many years?
So there can be and have been and will be no end of noises
and warnings and complaints, including tweets and reports and marvelous
marches. The evidence of the madness will accumulate and, in due course, the survivors’
stories will fill documentaries and history books with tales of
bewilderment.
This may have all started as the last contortion of Britain's imperial legacy, but the awful, hideous lesson of history is that, with this un-leader and this system, the end is
inevitable.
We are going to have to learn the hard way. I, for one, am wearing my thickest chain-mail.
We are going to have to learn the hard way. I, for one, am wearing my thickest chain-mail.
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