Greece: A Crisis Wrapped in a Calamity inside a Tragedy
This was originally published in The Mint, April 2017, following my personal odyssey to Athens in autumn 2016, but I think it's still relevant...
The road
south from Thermopylae – site of the battle in 480BCE where, for a few dread
days, a handful of Spartans held the
innumerable forces of Xerxes at bay – rises rapidly into mountains which, those
centuries ago, were impenetrable.
Elsewhere in the Greece of 2016 you may have found the roads to be
pitted and broken or, where the money had come abruptly to a halt, simply incomplete. Here the road is smooth and well maintained,
in some places even freshly tarmacked.
Curiously,
the road is flecked orange. As you
ascend, each switchback bend offers not only an astonishing view of valleys and
ancient artefacts but a steadily increasing density of orange dust. From time to time, as you negotiate the bend,
a disturbingly large truck is coming the other way. The trucks, too, are orange. They increase in number as you rise ever
higher until, as you crest a particularly daunting ridge, where the road is
entirely orange, you behold the source: Europe’s largest bauxite mine.
Bauxite – it
turns out – is the principal ore of aluminium.
No surprise, then, to find that a bauxite mine is a busy place; and no
surprise, too, to find that in the Greek economy of 2016 the mining of bauxite
is one of the few reliable ways of earning hard money. Mining bauxite, however, is hardly the kind
of high-tech, twenty-first century, investment-led and sustainable economic
activity that one might choose to have available if you wanted to rescue the
most wildly broken economy in the developed world.
What would
you want? Would you choose tourism? Probably not. It is the largest non-governmental sector in
the Greek economy, accounting for something like a quarter of all
employment. Chances are that you already
know that Greece is an amazing place, the birthplace of democracy, home of the
Acropolis, a place of legends where the sun shines and the islands beckon in
the glittering Aegean. On that basis,
you probably already know, too, that Greece is a nice place to go on holiday;
in fact, everyone probably already knows.
It may not be at touristic saturation point – perhaps there’s room for
an additional conference centre or two, for a few more coach tour operators,
for one or two more islands to be converted into playgrounds for the oblivious
offspring of the world’s prosperous elites – but the prospects for rapid and substantial
growth in earnings from tourism are surely limited. Global tourism will probably rise steadily in
the next decade or two (despite the ever-more obvious effects of climate
change) and Greece will undoubtedly get a share of that, but there are plenty
of other fabulous places vying for those euros, dollars and – more pertinently
– those renminbi.
So what
about the second largest sector in the Greek economy, shipping? Again, hardly
the sort of sector into which you’d want to put all your eggs right now. Greece may have the largest merchant shipping
fleet in the world (and the Greek shipping families may well be supporting
almost the entirety of the Athenian ‘luxury brands’ and ‘fine art’ sectors
these days) but world trade has been flatlining for a while now and, as the
recent collapse of South Korea’s Hanjin showed, even being the world’s seventh
largest shipping container firm will not protect you.
Both tourism
and shipping depend, critically, on the general state of economic affairs: by
and large, if the world economy does well, so too will these sectors; and vice
versa. The scope for using either of
these sectors as some sort of quasi-autonomous engine of recovery seems
limited, at best. (Something similar
applies in the case of bauxite, too.)
This is
perhaps less true of the remaining major (non-governmental) sector in the Greek
economy: agriculture. The demand for
food (certainly from within the developed world) tends not to be as variable as
might be the case with shipping and tourism; and, given the evolution of
tastes, there could well be scope for meeting high-value niches that might in
turn provide some sort of impetus to growth.
This is the sort of strategy adopted by Ireland as part of its
post-crisis recovery plan, and hints of it have appeared from the UK’s Defra as
it prepares for the brave new world outside the EU.
As these
examples illustrate, however, it is not so much ‘agriculture’ as ‘food’ that
represents the opportunity – and here, too, Greece finds itself in
trouble. Its agricultural sector
comprises a slightly larger share of its economy than is typical of a developed
country, but still contributes less than 4% of output; while its ‘value-added’
food sector tends to be focused on a relatively narrow group of idiosyncratic
items such as olive oil and cheese.
Competition in these markets is already intense. Here, too, it would be a brave soul who would
rely on this particular recovery vehicle.
What,
then? Greece, remember, is a country
which has seen its economy shrink by a quarter since the beginning of the
crisis. (Just imagine – or, better, try to imagine – what sort of effect
such a contraction might have had in the UK.)
It is a place where unemployment among the under 30s is officially
around 50% and where there are, to all intents and purposes, no job
opportunities for young people. They endured
(and got angry) for the first few years of the crisis but, as it became clear
that anything remotely approaching a normal recovery would not be arriving,
they began leaving: estimates suggest that the country’s population may have
declined by more than 5% in the past eighteen months, as the young and
entrepreneurial take themselves and their potential elsewhere in Europe.
Greece is a
country with a chronic and widespread disregard for many ‘normal’ economic
activities, such as (in the private sector) paying tax or (in the public
sector) living within the State’s means.
It is a country with debts so breathtakingly enormous that they are
incomprehensible. It is a country whose
capital city – one of the greatest cities on Earth, with an unmatched status in
world history – had, in October 2016, but one single development site with
construction underway. There were two
cranes.
*******
Greece
joined (what would become) the European Union in 1981. It seems, on that basis, to have begun a
joyful, ebullient and profligate romp towards what it perceived to be west
European modernity without any real regard for what that entailed. After a decade and a half or so of (largely
debt-funded) catch-up, it won the right to host to the 2004 Olympics and – on that basis – began a second and even
more extravagant wave of largely debt-funded development. For a year or two after the Olympics, the
country appears to have felt confident, future-oriented, included, prosperous –
and then the sky caved in. (Either that
or - as it was for the coyote that ran over the edge and, through sheer
animated momentum, remained suspended in the sky for a few wonderful moments - the
floor rushed up.)
The Greece
of 2016 does not have a sophisticated intermediate goods sector. It does not have a modern consumer goods
sector. It does not have a flourishing
games design sector, or indeed a contemporary value-added services sector of
any kind. It is a beautiful place full
of wonderful people and marvellous things, but it is essentially the same
economy it was in 1981: lots of tourism, lots of shipping, quite a few olives,
some mining, and a distended and unwieldy public sector.
Intuition
(or, for the brave, theory) might suggest that, with an economy in this kind of
condition, the opportunities for investment must surely now be rich. The costs of the various factors of
production must surely now be unbelievably low?
And this is indeed the case. Cast your eye over downtown Athens and
there are simply dozens, perhaps hundreds of empty buildings, going for a
song. In some cases entire streets are
abandoned. The wily investor must,
surely, be about to move in, to begin the process of re-development?
But why
would you? The regulatory environment in
Athens remains, at best, challenging.
Labour laws are hardly enticing to the modern footloose investor. Outside of a condensed retail and touristic
core, the city gives every impression of being on a journey from the first
world to the (old) third. Unless a
building has heavy-duty security, it will be covered in graffiti; there are
protest marches two or three times a week; despite the current lull, the
prospect of violence seems never too far away. Worst of all, it would be very
difficult to claim that the bottom has been reached. Why invest here rather than in one of a dozen
or more other zones stretched along the Mediterranean, where the sun shines,
the land is cheap and you’re nuzzled just inside the largest single market in
the world?
At a
personal level, I am profoundly miserable at having to write this down. I travelled to and through Athens and Greece
in the hope of gaining some insight, however tentative or fleeting, into a positive
future for this extraordinary country and its amazing citizens. And I did glimpse one or two slithers of
hope: a couple of agricultural schemes where families had returned to the land,
determined to incorporate deep ecological principles into their farming
practices; a co-operative where young people who had gained commercial skills
and experience in London and Paris and Bonn and Amsterdam were collaborating
with friends and colleagues in Greece to try to support the emergence of a new
entrepreneurial class; a handful of cafes and restaurants where music, food,
culture and lap-top-based commerce were fusing in an encouraging way.
But when I
stepped back to look at the bigger picture, such seeds of optimism look tiny
indeed. Irrespective of which methodological
or theoretical position you may choose to adopt – orthodox neo-classical,
institutional, evolutionary, ecological – the brute reality facing Greece is
that, even if half of its debt were to be written off (and some sort of write
off is both essential and inevitable) it would still owe a simply eye-watering amount of money – and it still
wouldn’t have the kind of economy capable of generating, on a sustained basis,
the kind of money its creditors are going to require.
Perhaps
there will be an even bigger write off.
Perhaps Greece will leave the Euro.
Perhaps something genuinely and profoundly new and different and
unexpected will occur. I do not know. In
my more pessimistic moments, I fear that the sons and daughters of Greece will
still be suffering the consequences of the Crisis not just in ten or twenty
years but in fifty, seventy, even a hundred years.
In my more
optimistic moments, I wonder if the Greeks of the twenty first century have
been replicating the sacrifice they made at Thermopylae two and a half
millennia ago. Then, they briefly held
back the overwhelming forces of Xerxes, and their sacrifice provided us with an
enduring model of heroism; now, they have faced the rapacious forces of modern
capitalism and been similarly overwhelmed. My optimistic hope is that their
sacrifice has not been in vain.
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